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-IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND MALLORY,
Plaintiff
and Appellant,

vs.
CHARLES W. TAGGART, ZIONS FIRST
NATIONAL BANK, LOUIS M. HAYNIE,
and HENRY D. MOYLE, JR.,
Defendants
and Respondents

Case
No.
11919

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment in the plaintiff's favor for failure of the Trial Court to determine
the amount due correctly, to include interest from the
due date of the contract, and to determine that the
judgment was secured by a lien on real estate.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court granted judgment against Charles
W. Taggart and in favor of plaintiff for the sum of
$12,631.25, together with the plaintiff's costs incurred. The award is unsatisfactory to plaintiff. The
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court refused to include in said judgment interest
fr.om the 31st day of December, 1966 to the date oi
judgment at the legal rate and refused to determine
that the judgment was secured by a lien on the land
which secured the original purchase price of plaintiff's stock.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have this court determine, as a
matter of law, that amount of judgment is inadequate, that he is entitled to interest on his unpaid
balance of purchase price since its due date, December 31, 1966, that the judgment is secured by a lien
on real property, and that additional payments to
plaintiff may become due in the future as title is
cleared to additional portions of the real property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was the owner of 140 shares of common
stock of Falconaero Enterprises, Inc. On the 8th day
of May, 1962, he agreed to sell said stock to defendant
Charles W. Taggart for a total price of $76,000.00.
Final payment on the purchase price to be due on the
31st of December, 1966. The sales contract referred
to another sales contract dated the 13th of February,
1962, to which both parties are named but which
the plaintiff did not sign. This contract is Exhibit
P-9.

The agreement provided that as long as the
Falconaero Corporation was in existence, the stock
\rnuld secure the purchase price to seller, and thereafter the price would be secured by the interest which
the stock shall represent in the mortgage issued to the
escrow holder referred to in Exhibit "A." The escrow
holder is First Security Bank as Trustee for the sellers
of stock in Falconaero.
Falconaero was dissolved, First Security Bank was
given a real estate mortgage on the 26th of July,
196), Exhibit P-1 O, and said mortgage secured the
payment of the purchase price remaining unpaid as
principal balance under the contract dated February
13, 1962.
The total amount of acreage covered by the mortgage, and which was sold to defendant Taggart, was
980 acres. However, it was agreed that should there
be acreage to which Falconaero could not furnish
good title, the purchase price would be reduced prorata. Taggart agreed to accept the land subject to
easements of record (Exhibit P-9, Para. 3 d). To the
date of trial, defendant claimed there had been 82.9%
of the 980 acres cleared of title defects. However,
defendant stipulated, for the purpose of calculating
the amount due plaintiff, that 83.1633% of the land
title had been cleared. (Findings of Fact No. 3, R. 38).
The evidence showed that a substantial amount
of the land that defendant claimed title had not been
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cleared on was in roads in three subdivisions, Mountain View, Asbury Park and St. Albans. The total in
the roads is 5 5 .25 acres ( R. 56) . There was no constructi.on of streets and roadways, though the rightof-ways were dedicated CR. 57). In addition to the
55.25 acres, there was 5.29 acres in alleyways on the
subdivision plats which also had not been constructed
CR. 58). The plats on the subdivisions were of record
in the County Recorder's office prior to the time when
plaintiff and defendant entered into their sales agreement ( R. 60, Exhibit P-12-13-14).
The two surveyors who testified at the trial, Mr.
Sorenson and Mr. Cope, agreed that Falconaero's
total acreage before reduction for streets, alleyways,
and roadvvays, was 926 acres (See R. 51, R. 66-67l.
Of this 926 acres, it was defendant's positi.on that the
plaintiff could not be paid for acres which were the
right-.of-ways and dedicated streets and alleyways h1
the three subdivisions. He refused to pay for other
easements totaling 37.06 acres CSee Exhibit D-8).
The amount of 926 acres was reduced to 835.32 acres.
The basic judgment on the amount which defendant
stipulated 'Nas 83.1633%. Plaintiff claims he is entitled to be paicl for the land in the easements for
streets, roadways, alleyways, and public utilities, a
t.otal of 926 acres. He claims judgment should be for
$24,026.10 plus interest to date of judgment at 6%
per annum.
4
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The court would not award plaintiff any interest
on the balance owing as determined by defendant's
figures. Plaintiff claims interest from December 31,
l %6 to the date of judgment at 6% per annum, an
amount of $2, 141.00.
The court would not award to plaintiff any attorney's fees, nor would it secure the judgment by a lien
on the land which was the principal asset of Falconaern Enterprises. The court would not permit the
plaintiff to participate in any acreage which was subject to easements nor which might be cleared of easements in the future. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment so entered by the court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE PAYMENT
OF THE PURCHASE PRICE OF PLAINTIFF'S
STOCK WAS SECURED BY A LIEN ON THE
ACREAGE OF FALCONAERO ENTERPRISES.
In plaintiff's Complaint, he alleges, Paragraph 5,
that under the terms of the sales agreement, the sales
price of the seller's stock would be secured by an
interest in the mortgage issued to the escrow holder
to guarantee the payment of the price of assets of
Falconaero Enterprises, Inc. Paragraph 6 then sets
forth that the sales agreement escrow was established
at First Security Bank of Utah, that a mortage to
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secure the purchase price of the assets of Falconaero
Enterprises, Inc. was issued which secured the
price of plaintiff's stock (R.2).
Defendant's answer admitted paragraphs 5 and
6 of the Complaint (R. 19).
The prayer of plaintiff's Complaint prayed that
the court determine plaintiff's security rights and for
an order selling the property to foreclose on the
security rights (R.3).
The judgment entered by the court simply gave
the plaintiff a personal judgment against Charles W.
Taggart and did not provide any security for the
payment of said price. Nor did it provide any right
on the part of the plaintiff to foreclose on the property
to secure payment of the balance owing to him.
It is respectfully submitted that the court deprives
plaintiff of a valuable and essential right by refusing
to recognize that the balance owing to him is secured
by a lien on the acreage of the Falconaero Enterprises
now held for defendant or his transferees.
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POINT II
THE COURT REFUSED TO DETERMINE
THAT THE EASEMENTS OF RECORD DO
NOT CONSTITUTE CLOUDS ON THE TITLE
OF THE PLAINTIFF AND ERRONEOUSLY
DETERMINED THE AMOUNT OF LAND
FOR WHICH PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PAID.
The disputed matter in the trial did not relate
to the total acreage included in the Falconaero property. Both Mr. Cope and Mr. Sorenson agreed that
it was 926 acres (See R. 51, R. 66-67). The dispute
between the parties arises out of the fact that in this
926 acres there were three platted subdivisions. They
were Asbury Park Addition, (Exhibit P-14), St.
Albans Subdivision, (Exhibit P-12), and Mountain
View Addition, (Exhibit P-13). These three subdivisions were all dedicated before Utah became a
state and the plats filed in 1890 and 1891. The defendant claims that the roads, alleyways and streets
platted in the subdivision should be eliminated from
the property for which he should pay. The land in
the alleyways and streets of the subdivision total
60.54 acres CR. 56, R. 58). There were other right-ofways on 21st South Street, Redwood Road, 31st South
Street, and miscellaneous right-of-ways amounting to
7.75 acres, and a Utah Power and Light right-of-way
amounting to 24.02 acres. (See Exhibit D-8 for surveyor Sorenson's calculations). The total amount of
acreage for which defendant refuses to pay is 92.31
acres. This is the only real disagreement between the
7

parties as to the amount of land for which defendant
should be required to pay.
The basic agreement covered this matter specifically. Paragraph 3 (d) of Exhibit P-9, the agreement, reads as follows:
"That the Corporation is the owner in fee1
subject only to easements of record, of 980
acres, more or less of land, which land is
described in Exhibit A, which is attached
hereto and is by this reference made a part
hereof; that the Corporation's title to said
land is free of all mortgages and liens, except
current taxes. In the event the land is less
than 980 acres, the price per share shall be
reduced proportionately for each acre less
than 980, and increased proportionately for
each acre above 980."

It is plaintiff's position that on all easements1
defendant took subject if they were of record. There
was no requirement that the acreage under easement
be subtracted from the total acreage. Liens and mortgages were the defects which the land was to be free
of.
As to the three subdivisions which have 60.54
acres of land in streets and alleyways, there can be no
doubt that these platted streets and alleyways were
only easements. The revised laws of 1898 were
identical with Section 36-1-7, Utah Code Annotated1
1943, which provided as follows:
8

"36-1-7. Public Acquires Only Easement-Fee
in Abutting Owner. By taking or accepting
land for a highway the public acquires only
the right of way and incidents necessary to
enjoying and maintaining it. A transfer of
land bounded by a highway passes the title
.of the person whose estate is transferred to
the.middle of the highway."
In Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 36 Utah
2S7, 102 P. 740, the court held that this statute simply
declared the common law which would have been
applicable prior to stateho.od and at the time the three
su bdjvisions were dedicated.
Even if the rights-of-way are clouds since the subdivisions \Vere never actually constructed and the
streets or alleyways set up, and since all of the land
surrounding the subdivisions is transferred to the
defendant, he can, by the simple process of petitioning for vacation of the subdivisi.ons, clear title of any
such easement cloud which is created by the dedications of the three subdivisions. To the time of trial,
defendant had not done this, but it is respectfully submitted that it was well within his means to do it at
anytime he saw fit, and his failure to have the subdivisions vacated and the dedications set aside could
mean only that he delayed for the purp.ose of preventing the necessity of paying for the land covered
by the roads, streets and alleyways, or wished the
land subdivided according to the plats.
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The language of the agreement is free from doubt.
The law, as far as interpretation of contracts is concerned, is clear and may not be ignored, the contract
language must be given full force and effect. See
Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d
160, 369 P.2d 928; Plain City Irrigation Company v.
Hooper Irrigation Company, 11 Utah 2d 188, 356
P.2d 625; Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah 2d 440, 354 P.2d
121; and Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah
2d 163, 321 P.2d 221.
In addition to the three subdivision roads and
alleys, the court would not permit plaintiff recovery
for the Utah Power and Light right-of-ways. There
was no question but what these right-of-ways were
dedicated and were in existence when the contracts
were entered into in 1962. The same language again,
it is respectfully submitted, applies. Defendant must
take the land subject to the easements on it as agreed.
If the court should determine that plaintiff is
entitled to be paid for the acreage which has easements on it, then plaintiff would be entitled to payment in full for the 926 acres, which is 94.49% of 980

acres.
The language "subject only to easements of
record" means that as to those easements, the defendant cannot eliminate the land from the acreage to
which title is clear. By applying this percentage to
10

the purchase price, the balance owing plaintiff would
be $24,026.10 rather than $12,631.25.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the court should
determine that the land covered by streets, alleyways, roadways, right-of-ways, as well as the land
covered by the Utah Power and Light right-of-way,
is not land which defendant may eliminate from the
acreage for which he must pay.
POINT III
THE AMOUNT DUE PLAINTIFF ON DECEMBER 31, 1966 SHOULD BEAR INTEREST
AT 6% THEREAFTER.
It seems to be universal that for the withholding
of money after due date, the amount of a party's damage is interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Young v.
Godbe, 15 Wall U.S. 562, 21 L. Ed. 250, decided May
1, 1873, established this principle. The Supreme
Court of the United States held that a debt owed at
a particular time, not paid due to default of debtor,
gave to the creditor interest from the due date. The
Supreme Court indicated that if there were no
statutes making this law, then the interest was to be
viewed as damages for unreasonable withholding.
Plaintiff finds no cases to the contrary to the
principle that the value of money withheld is interest
at the rate of 6% per annum. Some courts have stated
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this as an implied contract where there are accounts
on which no interest item is mentioned. CSee 25 CJS
'
Page 791, Damages, Section 52).
In the contract before the court, there is no interest provided during the period when payments of
principal are to be made, and apparently this was
taken into consideration in the price. However, following the due date, there would be a withholding
and use by defendant of monies which rightfully
belong to the plaintiff, and for this use, defendant
should be required to pay interest. Recent holdings
to this effect are Fischer Coe v. Loeffler-Green Supply
Co., Okla. 289, P2d 139, holding that a dispute as to
one item in an account does not stop the interest
running on the other items and on the balance determined to be due after it was due. In King Realty, Inc.
v. Grantwood Cemeteries, Inc., 4 Ariz. App. 76, 417
P2d 710, the Arizona Supreme Court held that money
wrongfully withheld grants to the creditor an automatic 6% interest as damages and recites the fact
that no authorities to the contrary to this have been
cited to it.

It is plaintiff's position that he was entitled to
judgment of $24,026.10, with interest at 6% per
annum from and after December 31, 1966, but
regardless of whether or not the court determines
this to be the correct amount due, he would still be
entitled to judgment for interest on the sum that the
12

court determined was the correct amount. Trial
Court would not even award interest on the
$12,631.25, which he found to be due pursuant to
what amounted to the stipulation by defendant.
POINT IV
THE COURT FAILED TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PAYMENTS
DUE FOR LAND, TITLE TO WHICH MAY BE
CLEARED IN THE FUTURE.
Plaintiff claims that even if the court should
determine that the streets, alleyways and easements
in the three subdivisions constitute clouds on the
title of Falconaero Enterprises, Inc., still plaintiff
should be given the right to participate in the price
to be paid for such acreage when the easements are
removed.
As has been pointed out in the argument heretofore made, since the land surrounding the three subdivisions is owned by defendant, he may vacate and
rPmove roads, alleys, or rights-of-way at any time.
Vacation is a simple matter. It is provided for
in Utah Code Annotated 1953, 5 7-5-7. Said Section
provides that vacation may be accomplished by filing
an application signed Ly all the owners of the land
contained in the entire plat, plus signatures .of the
owners of the land contiguous or adjacent to any
street or alley.
13

It is respectfully submitted that since the defendant owns the land on all sides of the unconstructed
roads and alleyways, that the vacation of the plats
and the subdivisions would be a simple matter to
accomplish whenever he saw fit.

CONCLUSION
The court should determine, in accordance with
the argument in Point II, that the roads, streets and
alleyways and other right-of-ways were easements of
record at the time of the purchase by defendant and
the title was taken subject to such easements. Defendant, therefore, should be required to pay for such
land. But if the court should determine that this is
not the fact, then it is respectfully submitted that the
plainiff should be given the right to participate in
this acreage whenever those easements are vacated.
The defendant has within his power the easy way
that the easements may be removed.
Judgment should be granted plaintiff for
$24,026.10, plus interest at 6% to date of judgment
from December 31, 1966, and grant plaintiff his
security rights in the land and order sale under the
foreclosure laws of the State of Utah.
Respectfully submitted,

DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
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